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Objective: This study examines how intergenerational coresidence modifies the association 
between women’s education and their household decision-making power in China. 
 
Background: Past research on how married women’s education increases their decision-making 
power at home has focused primarily on nuclear families. This article extends prior research by 
examining how this association varies by household structure. It compares women living with 
their husbands with those living with both their husbands and parents-in-law. 
 
Method: This article used data from the China Family Panel Studies in 2010 and 2014. It 
employed marginal structural models to address the concern that certain characteristics selecting 
women of less power into coresidence with their parents-in-law may be endogenous to women’s 
education. 
 
Results: In nuclear households, women with a higher level of education have a higher probability 
of having the final say on household decisions. In multigenerational households, however, where 
women live with their parents-in-law, a higher level of education of women is not associated 
with an increase in women’s decision-making power. 
 
Conclusion: Coresidence with husbands’ parents may undermine the effect of women’s 
education on their household decision-making power. 
 
Key Words: coresidence, decision-making, education, gender, intergenerational relations, power. 
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Decision-making power at home is essential to women’s empowerment (Malhotra & 
Schuler, 2005). Male dominance in family decision-making increases intimate partner violence 
(Coleman & Straus, 1986), depression (Mirowsky, 1985), and marital dissatisfaction (Pimentel, 
2000). Each spouse’s socioeconomic resources (Blood & Wolfe, 1960), gender attitudes 
(Blumberg & Coleman, 1989), and expertise in and share of household responsibilities (Raven, 
Centers, & Rodrigues, 1975; Zuo, 2008; Zuo & Bian, 2005) affect decision-making patterns. 
Women’s education may enhance their power by increasing their socioeconomic resources (Xu 
& Lai, 2002), exposing them to more egalitarian gender attitudes (Shu, 2004), and enhancing 
their capabilities to make household decisions (Kabeer, 2005). However, most studies on 
women’s education and decision-making power have focused on nuclear households and 
assumed that the division of power involves only the husband–wife dyad. Would higher 
education improve women’s decision-making power in multigenerational households? How 
might coresidence with the older generation moderate the effect of women’s education on their 
power? This article addresses this gap and examines how the relationship between women’s 
education and their decision-making power varies by household structure. Multigenerational 
relations and households are increasingly important, as longer life expectancies and population 
aging expand opportunities for intergenerational interactions (Bengtson, 2001). Understanding 
the association between women’s education and decision-making power in multigenerational 
households, therefore, has important implications for what aging societies mean for marital 
power equality. 
China offers an interesting context for this study. The ideal family in Chinese tradition is 
a patriarchal and patrilocal extended household where multiple generations coreside along the 
male lineage (Chu, Xie, & Yu, 2011; Pimentel & Liu, 2004). The central virtue is filial piety, the 
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norm that children should respect and care for their elderly parents (Z. Zhang, Gu, & Luo, 2014). 
Sons and their wives assume primary responsibilities for elderly care, whereas daughters live 
with their husbands’ families and care for their parents-in-law (Cong & Silverstein, 2008). The 
marital relationship between sons and their wives is secondary to the bond between sons and 
their parents in extended households (Zuo, 2009). Intergenerational coresidence remains 
prevalent and predominantly patrilocal in contemporary China; 67% of parents aged 65 and older 
lived with their adult children according to the 2005 China Inter-Census Survey (Zeng & Xie, 
2014). Most parents coresident with their adult children live with their sons and daughters-in-law 
(Chu et al., 2011). Rapid population aging and underdeveloped social security systems reinforce 
the cultural tradition of intergenerational coresidence that serves the needs of adult children in 
child care and elderly parents in old-age support (F. Chen, 2005; Q. F. Zhang, 2004). 
This study uses data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) to examine how the 
association between women’s education and decision-making power varies by household 
structure. It compares women living with their husbands with those living with husbands and 
parents-in-law. Decision-making patterns in households where women do not live with their 
husbands and where women live with their own parents are documented elsewhere (Pimentel & 
Liu, 2004; Zuo, 2008). How much women’s education translates into power may be mitigated 
when they live with their parents-in-law. Having a husband’s parents in the household not only 
increases potential candidates for decision-making power but also constitutes a form of resources 
for the husband. Power in patrilocal multigenerational families is guided by both gender and 
seniority (Zuo, 2009). Women may have little say in household decisions regardless of their 
education. 
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This study employs marginal structural models (MSM; VanderWeele, Vansteelandt, & 
Robins, 2010) to address two theoretical complexities. First, preexisting characteristics may 
select women with less power into coresidence with their parents-in-law. MSM uses fewer 
assumptions than other propensity score methods and conventional regressions to adjust for these 
characteristics (Austin, 2011). Second, some confounders of living arrangements may be 
endogenous to women’s education. Including such confounders in conventional regressions may 
yield biased estimates of the interaction between education and coresidence (Rosenbaum, 1984). 
MSM allows testing for interaction effects in the presence of such confounders (VanderWeele et 
al., 2010). 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Women’s Education and Household Decision-Making 
How is women’s education related to their decision-making power? First, education 
increases women’s resources, such as income, enhancing their bargaining power in family 
negotiations (Malhotra & Mather, 1997). Resource theory posits that each spouse’s decision-
making power varies with his or her resources (Blood & Wolfe, 1960). Each spouse provides the 
other with access to his or her resources to help satisfy the latter’s needs in exchange for the 
latter’s compliance. Both women’s absolute level of resources and their level of resources 
relative to their husbands’ may increase their power (Blumberg & Coleman, 1989). Education 
may increase resources in absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms, women with higher 
levels of education have higher income than those with lower levels of education (Heckman & 
Li, 2004). In relative terms, when compared with women with lower levels of education, women 
with higher levels of education are more likely to be more educated than their husbands. In 
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China, the proportion of women more educated than their husbands increases as women’s 
education increases (Han, 2010). 
Second, education exposes women to more egalitarian gender attitudes (Shu, 2004). 
Gender ideologies guide marital power processes (Blumberg & Coleman, 1989; Komter, 1989). 
Women with more egalitarian attitudes are more likely to assert themselves in family 
negotiations (Malhotra & Mather, 1997) and thus have more decision-making power (Shu, Zhu, 
& Zhang, 2013; Xu & Lai, 2002). Highly educated women also tend to marry highly educated 
men (Han, 2010), who are also more likely to hold egalitarian attitudes (Shu, 2004). Husbands 
with more egalitarian attitudes are more likely to share power with their wives (Shu et al., 2013). 
Third, education enhances women’s abilities to make informed household decisions 
(Kabeer, 2005). Resource theory assumes that spouses use personal resources to bargain for 
individual preferences in family decisions, but couples may value collective well-being (Zuo & 
Bian, 2005) and household utility maximization (Becker, 1981). The balance of power may thus 
be on the side of the spouse with more expertise in making decisions (Raven et al., 1975). 
Education increases women’s knowledge. Furthermore, education increases the probability of 
women being more educated than their husbands (Han, 2010) and thus having more knowledge 
than their husbands. Education, however, may not increase women’s power on mundane 
decisions. Chinese couples often pursue family well-being and practice power–responsibility 
congruence instead of resource-based power bargaining (Zuo, 2008; Zuo & Bian, 2005). Women 
gain expertise and acquire rights to make mundane and child-related decisions by doing 
housework and handling child care (Shu et al., 2013; Zuo & Bian, 2005). Women with high 
socioeconomic status may reduce their housework (Yu & Xie, 2012) and relinquish power on 
mundane decisions (Zuo & Bian, 2005). 
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Past research on women’s education and decision-making in China is scarce (Matthews 
& Nee, 2000; Shu et al., 2013; Yang & Zheng, 2013; Zuo, 2008; Zuo & Bian, 2005). Most 
studies have examined small nonnational samples, except for Shu et al. (2013), who used a 
national urban sample in 2000, and Yang and Zheng (2013), who used a 2010 national sample. 
Both studies found that more than half of the married couples made decisions together, but 
husbands had more power over major economic decisions, whereas wives had more power over 
daily expenditures. Shu et al. (2013) found no association between urban women’s education and 
their decision-making power. They found that women’s egalitarian attitudes enhanced their 
power on economic decisions; doing housework and handling child care increased their power 
on mundane and child-related decisions. Yang and Zheng (2013) found that women’s education 
and egalitarian attitudes enhanced their power. They found no association between women’s 
housework and power. One possible explanation for the inconsistencies between these studies is 
that both tested multiple predictors of power by including education, gender attitudes, income, 
and housework in one regression. Such models require strong assumptions about how each of 
these variables is related to the outcome (VanderWeele et al., 2010). The effect of education may 
be mediated by income, gender attitudes, and housework. 
This article focuses on the total effect of women’s education on their decision-making 
power and how it varies by household structure. It hypothesizes that in nuclear households, 
women’s education increases the probability of their having the final say on household decisions. 
Women’s income, gender attitudes, and housework, as well as the difference between these 
characteristics and those of their husbands’, may explain part of the association between 
women’s education and decision-making power. Husbands’ education and the difference 
between wives’ and husbands’ education may also explain the association between women’s 
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education and power. Testing these mechanisms, however, is beyond the scope of this study. 
This study focuses on the role of women’s absolute level of education rather than their level of 
education relative to their husbands’. The main purpose of this article is to understand how 
improving women’s educational attainment may empower them at home rather than the 
implications of spousal choices for decision-making power. This study focuses on education 
rather than income and occupation because education is less prone to endogeneity. Women with 
less decision-making power at home may be more likely to give up their careers after marriage. 
Intergenerational Coresidence and Household Decision-Making 
Patrilocal coresidence may undermine the effect of women’s education on their decision-
making power for three main reasons. First, coresidence with husbands’ parents may increase the 
number of potential candidates for decision-making power. In coresident households, the 
relevance of wives’ resources and expertise gets evaluated by their husbands and parents-in-law 
(Malhotra & Mather, 1997; Szinovacz, 1987). Husbands’ parents also bring their own resources, 
gender attitudes, and expertise to the decision-making process. Under the resource theory 
framework, the value of the wife’s resources needs to outweigh the combined value of the 
resources of her husband and parents-in-law for her to have the final say on decisions in 
coresident households. Thus the same amount of resources may entail greater bargaining power 
in nuclear than in coresident families. 
Second, the presence of the husband’s parents in the household constitutes a form of 
resources for the husband. His parents may act as his allies in decision-making (W. T. Liu, 
Hutchison, & Hong, 1973; Szinovacz, 1987). In nuclear families, spouses are more directly 
interdependent and rely on each other for services and companionship (Whyte, 1978). In 
patrilocal coresident households, the conjugal bond is weaker and secondary to the husband’s 
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bond with his parents (Zuo, 2009). The husband is obligated to maintain the intergenerational 
order in the household to secure his parents’ old age benefits and preserve the male lineage (Zuo, 
2009). Hence male dominance in patrilocal households may be in the interest of the husband and 
his parents. Women’s education may thus have limited effect in family negotiations. 
Finally, the traditional patriarchal family norms in China may not allow wives to bargain 
for power in the first place. Power in traditional patrilocal multigenerational households is 
guided by both gender and seniority (Zuo, 2009). The wife is typically at the bottom of the 
power hierarchy, whether the household head is the husband or his parent and whether she lives 
with one or both of her parents-in-law (Zuo, 2009). She is supposed to serve the needs of the 
entire household (F. Chen, 2004). Yu and Xie (2018) found that the motherhood wage penalty 
was larger in patrilocal than in nuclear households, probably because women in patrilocal 
households perform both child care and elderly care. Although women may coordinate 
housework and child care with their mothers-in-law in contemporary patrilocal households, the 
relative status of women and their mothers-in-law has not reversed (F. Chen, 2004). Thus women 
may have little say in household decisions regardless of their education if such generation-based 
patriarchy prevails. 
In summary, this article hypothesizes that in nuclear households, women’s education 
increases the probability of their having the final say on household decisions. However, in 
multigenerational households where women live with their parents-in-law, women’s education 
does not increase their decision-making power. The association between women’s education and 




This study used 2010 and 2014 data from the CFPS. The CFPS is a nearly nationwide 
longitudinal biennial survey since 2010 in 25 provinces or their administrative equivalents, 
representative of 95% of the national population (Xie & Lu, 2015). It interviews all members of 
sampled households. It surveyed 14,960 households and their 42,590 members in 2010. The unit 
of analysis in this article is a married woman. This study drew data on her siblings and parents 
from her interview, data on her husband and his siblings and parents from his interview, and 
household data from the family questionnaire answered by the household member most familiar 
with the family structure. Decision-making outcomes were collected in 2014. Living 
arrangements were measured in the same wave to focus on the household structure within which 
decisions were made. How the effect of education varies by changes in household structure over 
time is beyond the scope of this study. Women with less decision-making power may be more 
likely to live with their parents-in-law. Factors identified by prior work as confounders of 
coresidence were measured in 2010, temporally before the cross-sectional measure of living 
arrangements in 2014, to model selection into coresidence with parents-in-law in 2014 (Sharkey 
& Elwert, 2011), except for wives’ and husbands’ gender attitudes collected only in 2014. This 
study cannot implement fixed effects models to address unobserved time-invariant confounders 
because decision-making outcomes were measured only in the 2014 CFPS. 
The analytic sample was constructed in the following steps. First, it excluded women 
who did not respond or who were not living with their husbands. Of the 13,875 married women 
surveyed in 2010, 3,558 were not interviewed in 2014. Panel sampling weights were applied to 
adjust for sampling design and loss to follow-up (Xie & Lu, 2015). Of the women interviewed in 
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2014, 1,623 did not live with husbands in both waves; 44 were not married in 2014. A total of 
1,227 women whose husbands were not interviewed lacked data on husbands’ income, 
occupation, class, health, siblings, and attitudes. This study followed prior work’s methods to 
handle missing partner data (Seaman, White, Copas, & Li, 2012; Young & Johnson, 2013). 
Women without husband responses were included in multiple imputation, but not in the analyses. 
The results were weighted by the inverse probability of partner response, estimated by a logistic 
regression of whether a woman had a husband response on all variables except for those 
variables observed only among women with partner responses (see online appendix for details). 
Partner response did not vary by women’s age, living arrangements, Hukou, or their husbands’ 
education, but decreased with their education among those with rural Hukou. After weighting, 
covariate distributions of women with partner responses are representative of those with and 
without partner responses (Seaman et al., 2012). 
Second, women without living parents-in-law in 2014 were excluded so that each woman 
had a nonzero probability of living with in-laws in 2014; 23% of women from the first step had 
no data on whether their in-laws were alive in 2014. Multiple imputation included whether in-
laws were alive in 2010 (8% missing) and 2016 (11% missing), their ages, and all other variables 
in the analyses (White, Royston, & Wood, 2011). Of the women from the first step, 42% 
(averaged across imputations) had no living in-laws in 2014. The results were substantively 
similar when the analyses excluded women without data on whether their in-laws were alive in 
2014. Third, this study excluded 5% of women from previous steps living with their own parents 
in 2014 to focus on the contrast between nuclear families and patrilocal coresidence. Fourth, it 
excluded 4% of women from previous steps who were childless so that child-related decision-
making applied to each woman. The results were similar when childless women were included. 
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Finally, women’s ages were limited to 20 to 65 years in 2010. The minimum age of women of 
the highest education level, 2-year college or higher, was 20. The 99th percentile of ages of 
women from previous steps was 65. As discussed later, the results did not vary statistically 
significantly by age (results not shown). 
This study conducted separate analyses by women’s Hukou given drastic differences in 
education by Hukou, the household registration system institutionalizing rural–urban inequality 
in China (Wu & Zhang, 2010). The results were substantively similar for women with rural 
Hukou in rural and urban areas. Women with rural Hukou are henceforth addressed as rural and 
those with urban Hukou as urban. Multiple imputation by chained equations was applied to 
handle missing data. Most variables were missing for less than 5% of the sample (see online 
appendix for percent missing of each variable). The results were combined across 50 imputations 
using standard formulas (Rubin, 1987). The sample size of each imputed dataset varied because 
whether women had any living in-laws and whether they lived with their own parents were 
imputed. The mean sample size was 2,885 for rural women and 1,013 for urban women. 
Outcome Variables 
This study measured a woman’s decision-making power by whether she had the final say 
on five household decisions, 0 = “not having the final say,” 1 = “having the final say.” Separate 
models were estimated for each decision. The final-say measure denotes a specific power 
dimension, that is, overt power outcomes (Xu & Lai, 2002). The analyses combined women 
whose husbands had the final say and whose other household members had the final say. The 
results were substantively similar when they were conditional on the married couple having the 
final say. The 2014 survey asked the family respondent “who has the final say” on each of the 
following decisions: (a) household expenditure; (b) savings, investment, and insurance; (c) 
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buying a house; (d) educating and disciplining the children; and (e) buying expensive goods 
(such as refrigerators, air conditioners, and furniture sets). The respondent was instructed to 
select one final decision-maker and did not have the option to choose that no single person had 
the final say or that household members had an equal say. As discussed later, this measure is 
limited in reflecting joint decision-making processes. Nevertheless, the results of this article 
using the final-say measure may shed light on how women’s education and household structure 
are related to other measures of decision-making power. Women with a higher level of education 
may be more involved in the negotiation process than those with a lower level of education. 
Coresidence with husbands’ parents may undermine the effect of women’s education in the 
negotiations.  
Decision-making outcomes were reported by the family respondents. The interviewer 
asked who the most appropriate person to answer family structure questions was and chose such 
a household member aged 18 and older as the family respondent. Among rural women, 41% of 
their outcomes were reported by themselves, 44% by their husbands, and 16% by others. Among 
urban women, 48% were reported by themselves, 41% by their husbands, and 11% by others. A 
wife’s education and living arrangements may affect whether she was the family respondent and 
how she perceived her power. Sensitivity analyses suggest that the associations between 
women’s education, living arrangements, and decision-making power were not mediated by who 
the family respondent was (results not shown). The final-say measure has good internal 
consistency in Chinese societies (Y. Chen & Yi, 2006). The association between education and 
decision-making power is similar across husbands’ and wives’ reports, although their reports of 
who has the final say slightly differ (Y. Chen & Yi, 2006; Chien & Yi, 2014). A total of 1% of 
rural women and 3% of urban women had missing values on at least one of the outcomes. 
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Missingness did not vary by women’s and their husband’s education or living arrangements. This 
study included the imputed outcomes because it involved multiple outcomes (Johnson & Young, 
2011). The results remained the same when imputed outcomes were excluded. 
Predictor Variables 
The predictor variables were women’s education and living arrangements. Women’s 
living arrangements were measured by whether they lived with parents-in-law in 2014, 0 = “not 
living with parents-in-law,” 1 = “living with parents-in-law.” Women’s education was measured 
as the highest level of education attained. For rural women, the education levels included less 
than elementary school, elementary school, and middle school or higher; less than elementary 
school was the reference category. Rural women who finished at least middle school were coded 
as one group because only 6.8% of rural women finished at least high school. For urban women, 
the education levels included less than high school, high school, and 2-year college or higher; 
less than high school was the reference category. Urban women without a high school education 
were coded as one group for more parsimonious models. There were no significant differences, 
substantively or statistically, between women who did not finish middle school and women who 
finished middle but not high school. Of the urban women, 8.5% did not finish elementary school 
and 10.3% did not finish middle school. This study did not formally compare the effect of 
education between rural and urban women given drastic distributional differences in their 
education. Unifying the coding scheme of education between rural and urban women may result 
in small categories with large standard errors or large categories that assume homogeneity 
among heterogeneous groups. Using a continuous measure such as years of schooling may 
impose a normality assumption on the conditional distribution of education given the covariates 
and a linearity assumption on the effect of education on decision-making. 
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Control Variables 
This study accounted for a wide range of variables to address selection into women’s 
education and living arrangements. Otherwise, the difference in the effects of education between 
nuclear and coresident families may not be due to the difference in household structure, but 
rather to some other factor that affects both the outcome and education or coresidence. This 
study assumes that there are no unmeasured confounders, similar to conventional regression-
based approaches (Austin, 2011). Measurement details of all control variables are available in 
Tables A1 to A5 in the online appendix. 
Confounders of education affect women’s education and power. They included wife’s 
age, birth region, ethnicity, parental education and occupation, number of siblings, whether she 
has a brother, and whether she is the first-born child. Her demographic, parental, and sibling 
characteristics shape her educational opportunities (Connelly & Zheng, 2003) and affect her 
power by gender-role socialization (Blumberg & Coleman, 1989; McHale, Crouter, & 
Whiteman, 2003). Her age is correlated with length of marriage, which increases her power (H. 
W. Liu, 1959; Wolf, 1985; Zuo, 2009). Her parents’ socioeconomic status is a form of her 
resources, enhancing her power (Xu & Lai, 2002). 
Confounders of living arrangements affect coresidence and decision-making. First, 
wives’ and husbands’ economic, parental, and personal resources affect coresidence (Chu et al., 
2011; Z. Zhang et al., 2014) and decision-making (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Katz & Peres, 1985; 
Xu & Lai, 2002). Economic resources included their respective education, occupation, income, 
social class, and homeownership and husbands’ Hukou. Parental resources included their 
respective numbers of living parents, parents aged 75 and older, and parents’ education and 
occupation. Personal resources included their self-rated health, interviewer-rated appearance, and 
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age difference. Second, wives’ and husbands’ gender attitudes affect coresidence (Chu et al., 
2011) and decision-making (Shu et al., 2013). Attitudinal measures included four items on 
divisions of labor and five items on filial obligations (see Table A4 in the online appendix). 
Dowry and how the couple met reflect their gender attitudes and affect coresidence (Yasuda, 
Iwai, Yi, & Xie, 2011) and decision-making (Conklin, 1979). Their respective migrant status, 
birthplace, birth cohort, ethnicity, and sibling age–sex composition affect coresidence (Chu et al., 
2011; Cong & Silverstein, 2010) and influence decision-making via gender-role socialization 
(Blumberg & Coleman, 1989; McHale et al., 2003; Yang & Zheng, 2013). Finally, household 
characteristics affect coresidence (Chu et al., 2011) and decision-making (Xu & Lai, 2002). They 
included household income, whether the household engaged in farm work or a family business, 
whether it was in an urban area, whether the woman lived with her children, whether she had a 
child younger than age 6, and whether she lived with a married child. 
Figure 1 displays the causal pathways linking education, coresidence, and decision-
making. As coresidence is endogenous to women’s education, some confounders of coresidence, 
such as women’s income, are endogenous to their education. These confounders are time-
dependent confounders (VanderWeele et al., 2010). Confounders of coresidence thus consist of 
women’s education, confounders of education (preeducation controls), and time-dependent 
confounders (posteducation precoresidence controls). Variables that affect decision-making but 
are affected by coresidence were excluded because they are mediators rather than confounders of 
coresidence. Examples of such covariates are the division of housework and child care between 
women and coresident parents-in-law, proximity to women’s noncoresident parents and parents-
in-law, and financial exchanges with noncoresident parents and parents-in-law. 
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Analytic Strategy 
To examine how the association between women’s education and decision-making power 
varies by household structure, this study employed MSM using inverse probability of treatment 
weighting (IPTW; Robins, Hernán, & Brumback, 2000; VanderWeele et al., 2010). MSM using 
IPTW are two-step models. First, propensity score models are constructed to model selection 
into treatments by regressing treatment status on confounders. Applying the inverse probability 
of treatment weights estimated from these models creates a synthetic sample in which 
confounders are independent of treatments. Second, MSM is estimated as a weighted regression 
of outcomes on treatments. MSM builds on propensity score methods, and the parameters of 
MSM are IPTW estimators (Robins et al., 2000). MSM offers several advantages over 
conventional regressions and other propensity score methods. 
First, MSM using IPTW requires fewer assumptions. Compared to conventional 
regressions, IPTW does not require correct specification of the association between covariates 
and outcomes (Austin, 2011). Compared to propensity score matching or stratification, IPTW 
requires fewer distributional assumptions about the underlying data (Curtis, Hammill, Eisenstein, 
Kramer, & Anstrom, 2007). Compared to propensity score covariate adjustment, which regresses 
outcomes on treatments and propensity scores, IPTW regresses outcomes on treatments using the 
propensity score weighted sample. Therefore, unlike propensity score covariate adjustment, 
IPTW does not require correct specification of the association between propensity scores and 
outcomes (Austin, 2011).  
Second, MSM allows adjustment for time-dependent confounders (VanderWeele et al., 
2010). Some covariates confounding the association between coresidence and power are effects 
of education. Controlling for such confounders in a conventional regression may yield biased 
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estimates of the interaction between education and coresidence (Rosenbaum, 1984). It “controls 
away” part of the effect of education on power and induces an association between unobserved 
confounders and education (Sharkey & Elwert, 2011, p. 1951). MSM circumvents the issue by 
including time-dependent confounders in calculating the inverse probability of treatment weights 
of coresidence and excluding them in education weights. Weighting each subject by the product 
of the weights of coresidence and education produces a pseudo-population in which confounders 
of education are independent of education and confounders of coresidence are independent of 
coresidence. MSM uses the weighted data to fit a model of the marginal mean of the potential 
outcome on education, coresidence, and the education–coresidence interaction. It does not need 
to include any confounders, which are already adjusted for by weighting (Robins et al., 2000). It 
is saturated and not subject to misspecification (VanderWeele et al., 2010). 
This study implemented MSM in several steps. First, propensity score models were 
estimated for education and coresidence, respectively. Second, inverse probability of treatment 
weights were derived from these models. Finally, main and interaction effects of education and 
coresidence were estimated from the MSM with these weights applied. 
Propensity score models. Equation 1 expresses the propensity score model for education, 
a multinomial logistic regression of education (E) on preeducation covariates (X). j refers to an 
education level other than the reference level. E = 0 is when education is at the reference level. A 
multinomial logistic model is used instead of an ordered logit model because although education 
levels have an intrinsic order, the effect of covariates on education may not be proportional. 
Equation 2 expresses the propensity score model for coresidence, a logistic regression of 
coresidence (C) on education (E), preeducation covariates (X), and posteducation precoresidence 
covariates (V). C = 1 is when the wife lived with her parents-in-law. 
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 log
P (E = j | X)
P (E = 0 | X)
= α0+ α1X,	j	>	0 
(1) 
 logit [P (C = 1 | E, X, V)] = γ0+ γ1E+ γ2X+ γ3V (2) 
 
IPTW. IPTW is the inverse of the predicted probability of the subject receiving the 
observed treatment. Stabilized weights include the marginal probability of observed treatment in 
the numerator to improve efficiency (VanderWeele et al., 2010). Equation 3, where e denotes the 
observed education level, expresses stabilized education weights, the denominator of which was 
derived from Equation 1. Equation 4, where c denotes the observed coresidence type, expresses 
stabilized coresidence weights, the denominator of which was from Equation 2. Equation 5 
expresses the final weights, the products of education weights, coresidence weights, and 
sampling weights (SW). SW is the product of panel sampling weights and the inverse probability 
of partner response to adjust for sampling design, loss to follow-up, and partner nonresponse. 
The product of weights of education and coresidence was truncated at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles before being multiplied by SW to improve precision (Cole & Hernán, 2008). 
 
WE= 
P (E = e)




P (C = c | E = e)
P (C = c | E	= e,	X , V) 
(4) 
 W= WE× WC× SW (5) 
MSM. As expressed in Equation 6, it is a linear model, regressing whether a woman had 
the final say on her education, coresidence, and the interaction between education and 
coresidence, weighted by the weights from Equation 5. Although the outcome is binary, a linear 
model yields more easily interpretable coefficients than a logistic one because the model is 
saturated. Coefficients in Equation 6 can be directly interpreted on the probability scale. E[Ye’c’] 
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is the predicted probability of a woman having the final say if she had education level e’ and 
coresidence type c’. β0 equals E[Y00], the probability of a woman having the final say if she had 
the reference level education and no coresident parents-in-law. β1 is the Average Treatment 
Effect (ATE) of education among women not living with in-laws. β1 equals E[Yj0] – E[Y00], the 
difference in the probability of a woman having the final say if she had education level j versus 
the reference level in nuclear households. β2 equals E[Y01] – E[Y00], the difference in the 
probability of a woman with reference level education having the final say if she lived with in-
laws versus if she did not. β3 equals (E[Yj1] – E[Y01]) – (E[Yj0] – E[Y00]), the difference in the 
ATE of education between women with coresident parents-in-law and those without. β1 + β3 
equals E[Yj1] – E[Y01], the ATE of education among women living with parents-in-law.  
 E[Ye'c'] = β0+ β1E+ β2C+ β3EC  (6) 
Standard errors were estimated using standard bootstrapping procedures from 2,000 
iterations. Each iteration bootstrapped the entire procedure delineated above. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Results 
Table 1 describes sample outcome distributions. Women were the least likely to have the 
final say on housing and the most likely to have the final say on child education. A total of 20% 
of rural women and 37% of urban women had the final say on housing, and 39% of rural women 
and 53% of urban women had the final say on child education. Urban women were more likely 
to have the final say on any of the decisions than rural women. More than 45% of urban women, 
compared to less than 30% of rural women, had the final say on household expenditure, savings, 
and expensive purchases. For about 7% of urban women and 11% of rural women, household 
members other than women and their husbands had the final say. Table 2 describes the 
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distributions of the predictors. Urban women were more educated than rural women. Of the rural 
women, 61% did not finish middle school; 54% of urban women finished at least middle school. 
Rural women were more likely to live with parents-in-law than urban women (35% vs. 29%). 
The coresidence rates were similar to those in prior work (Chu et al., 2011; Ma & Wen, 2016). 
Among rural women, coresidence rates did not differ statistically significantly by education, 
although middle school graduates had the highest coresidence rate (37%). Among urban women, 
high school graduates were less likely to live with parents-in-law than nongraduates (22% vs. 
32%). Of the college-educated urban women, 29% lived with in-laws. College-educated women 
were no less likely to live with in-laws than less-educated women probably because their 
opportunity cost of child care was higher and coresidence may help satisfy their child care needs 
(Ma & Wen, 2016). 
Propensity Score Models and Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights 
Table 3 describes the sample distributions of the control variables statistically significant 
at the p < .05 level in the propensity score models among rural or urban women. Descriptive 
statistics of all control variables are in Tables A1 to A5 in the online appendix. The propensity 
score models have no causal interpretations. Their sole purpose is to construct the weights to 
achieve covariate balance (Sharkey & Elwert, 2011). The coefficients and standard errors of 
these models are not shown for brevity (available on request). The IPTW had means close to 1 
and small standard deviations (see Table A6 in the online appendix), which met the necessary 
condition for correct propensity score model specification (Cole & Hernán, 2008). Absolute 
standardized differences quantify the balance of covariates among treatment groups. Any 
differences greater than 0.25 may suggest imbalance (Harder, Stuart, & Anthony, 2010). Before 
weighting, the largest differences between any two levels of women’s education were in their 
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ages, birth regions, numbers of siblings, and parents’ education and occupation. The largest 
differences between women in nuclear and coresident families were in their ages, their husbands 
having a brother, and homeownership. After weighting, the differences between any two levels 
of education were less than 0.25 in all confounders of education; the differences between women 
in nuclear and coresident households were less than 0.25 in all confounders of coresidence. 
Alternative weight estimation methods including generalized boosted models (Mccaffrey et al., 
2013) and covariate balancing scores (Imai & Ratkovic, 2014) did not further improve balance. 
MSM 
Table 4 presents the MSM results. The education coefficient was the ATE of education 
on decision-making among women in nuclear households. The coefficient of the education–
coresidence interaction was the difference in the ATE of education between women with 
coresident parents-in-law and those without. The sum of the coefficients of education and the 
education–coresidence interaction was the ATE of education among women with coresident 
parents-in-law, the standard errors of which are in Table A7 in the online appendix. 
Women’s education increased the probability of their having the final say on all decisions 
among rural women in nuclear households. The probability of rural women in nuclear families 
having the final say was at least nine percentage points higher if they finished elementary school 
and at least 11 percentage points higher if they finished middle school when compared with 
those who did not finish elementary school. Among urban women in nuclear households, 
education did not uniformly increase their power on all decisions. When compared with those 
who did not finish high school, urban women who finished high school were statistically 
significantly more likely to have the final say on savings and child education and marginally 
significantly more likely on expenditure and housing. The probability of the wife having the final 
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say on expensive purchases did not vary by her education. College-educated women were not 
statistically significantly different from women with less than a high school education in their 
power on any of the decisions. 
The effect of education was less positive in multigenerational households than in nuclear 
households. The probability of women having the final say did not increase with their education 
when they lived with parents-in-law. The effect of a middle school education relative to less than 
an elementary school education was insignificant for all decisions among rural women with 
coresident in-laws. The effect of a middle school education was at least 17 percentage points 
smaller in coresident than in nuclear households for decisions on expenditure, savings, housing, 
and expensive purchases; it was marginally significantly smaller on child education. The 
probability of rural women in coresident households having the final say on housing and child 
education if they finished elementary school was smaller than if they did not. The effect of an 
elementary school education relative to less than an elementary school education was at least 21 
percentage points smaller in coresident than in nuclear households for all decisions. Among 
urban women with coresident parents-in-law, the probability of their having the final say did not 
vary by their education on any of the decisions. The effect of a high school education relative to 
less than a high school education was at least 35 percentage points smaller in coresident than in 
nuclear households for decisions on expenditure, savings, and expensive purchases; it was 
marginally significantly smaller on housing and child education. The effect of a college 
education relative to less than a high school education did not differ between women with 
coresident parents-in-law and those without. 
This study also estimated a conventional logistic regression of whether a woman had the 
final say on her education, coresidence, the education–coresidence interaction, and all control 
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variables (results not shown). The estimated coefficients of women’s education, coresidence, and 
the education–coresidence interaction using this conventional method were similar in statistical 
significance to the MSM approach, that is, a logistic regression of whether a woman had the final 
say on her education, coresidence, and the education–coresidence interaction weighted by the 
weights from Equation 5. The estimates of conventional regressions, however, may be biased 
because these regressions may overcontrol confounders endogenous to women’s education and 
result in a correlation between unobserved confounders and women’s education (Sharkey & 
Elwert, 2011). 
DISCUSSION 
This study extends prior research on women’s education and decision-making power by 
examining how the effect of education on power varies by household structure in China. In 
nuclear households, women’s education increases the probability of their having the final say on 
household decisions. Coresidence with husbands’ parents, however, undermines the effect of 
women’s education on their decision-making power. The probability of the wife having the final 
say does not increase with her education when she lives with her husband’s parents. 
Education enhances women’s decision-making power in nuclear households by 
increasing their resources, egalitarian attitudes, and decision-making abilities (Blood & Wolfe, 
1960; Kabeer, 2005; Shu, 2004). Receiving some formal education increases rural women’s 
power in nuclear households. Rural women with at least an elementary school education are 
more likely to have the final say than those without. Urban women with a high school education 
in nuclear households have more power than those without. The difference between urban 
women with a college education and those with less than a high school education is insignificant. 
The difference between college and high school graduates in nuclear families is also 
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insignificant. One explanation is the small urban sample size, which produces large standard 
errors and imprecise estimates. Another possibility is that highly educated women may 
relinquish power on family decisions to focus on their careers (Zuo & Bian, 2005). Housework 
hours also decrease with urban women’s socioeconomic status (Yu & Xie, 2012). Women of 
lower socioeconomic status may gain expert knowledge by doing housework and acquire the 
power to make household decisions given their expertise (Shu et al., 2013; Zuo & Bian, 2005). 
The positive effect of women’s education on their decision-making power is undermined 
in patrilocal multigenerational households. The association between women’s education and 
their decision-making power is nonpositive if they live with their parents-in-law in China. Power 
in patrilocal multigenerational households is guided by both gender and seniority (Zuo, 2009). 
The husband has an obligation to maintain the intergenerational order to secure his parents’ old-
age benefits and preserve the male lineage (Zuo, 2009). The wife is expected to serve the needs 
of her husband and parents-in-law (F. Chen, 2004). Women may have little say on household 
decisions regardless of their education when they live with parents-in-law. 
Some limitations of this study call for future research. First, this study focused on the 
final-say measure of decision-making power. This power form is theoretically important because 
it reflects overt power outcomes (Xu & Lai, 2002). The same power outcome may result from 
various power processes. Women may have the final say because their husbands delegate to 
them power on mundane decisions (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970). The decision outcome may result 
from competitive bargaining or cooperative interactions (Szinovacz, 1987). It may serve personal 
interests of the one with the final say (Blood & Wolfe, 1960) or collective family interests (Zuo, 
2008; Zuo & Bian, 2005). Decisions may be negotiated among family members, implying joint 
decisions (Zuo & Bian, 2005). Prior studies found that over half of Chinese couples made joint 
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decisions, though husbands had more influence over major economic decisions whereas wives 
had more control over daily expenditures (Shu et al., 2013; Yang & Zheng, 2013). Power may be 
reflected in the negotiation process, though those participating in the process may not have the 
final say (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970). Women’s education may increase their involvement in the 
negotiations. Coresidence with husbands’ parents may diminish the effect of women’s education 
in the process. The results of this study using the final-say measure may shed light on how 
women’s education and household structure are related to other measures of decision-making 
power. 
Second, although this study uses marginal structural models to control for a wide range of 
confounders that may select women into coresidence and certain education levels, it assumes that 
there are no unobserved confounders. This study cannot implement fixed effects models to 
address unobserved time-invariant confounders because the outcomes were measured only in 
2014. This study lacked direct controls on some factors that may confound the associations 
between women’s education, coresidence, and decision-making power. Societal gender ideology 
and male domination in politics and the economy may affect women’s education and gender-role 
socialization (Kabeer, 2005). These structural factors may limit the effect of women’s education 
on their decision-making power (Blumberg & Coleman, 1989). Individual commitment to 
marriage and personality traits may affect the couple’s preferences for living arrangements and 
decision-making (Blumberg & Coleman, 1989). Although this study controlled for wives’ and 
husbands’ parental occupation when they were 14 and whether their parents were aged 75 and 
older, it lacked direct controls on parents’ health and employment status, which reflect parental 
resources that affect power. 
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Third, the associations between education, coresidence, and decision-making may vary 
during the life course (Zuo, 2009). Robustness checks were conducted on whether age was 
adequately controlled and whether the results varied by age. The absolute standardized 
differences in age among levels of education and coresidence were less than 0.25 after 
weighting, suggesting adequate balance on age (Harder et al., 2010). Intergenerational 
coresidence may respond to women’s child-care needs when they were of childbearing ages 
(younger than age 45); it may respond to their in-laws’ elderly care needs when they were older 
(F. Chen, 2005). This study tested whether the results varied by whether women were aged 45 
and older following the approach by VanderWeele et al. (2010). The numerators of Equations 3 
and 4 were modified to be conditional on whether women were aged 45 and older. The marginal 
structural model included three additional interactions, between whether women were aged 45 
and older and education, between whether women were aged 45 and older and coresidence, and 
between whether women were aged 45 and older, education, and coresidence. None of the 
interactions was statistically significant. The interactions between age in years, education, and 
coresidence were also insignificant. The difference in the effect of women’s education on their 
power between those in nuclear and coresident households did not vary significantly by age in 
this study. 
This study suggests that research on decision-making power in marriage should consider 
the impact of the extended family. Coresidence between married children and elderly parents in 
the United States often involves frail or widowed parents (Keene & Batson, 2010). Although 
intergenerational coresidence is not as common in the United States as in China, marital 
relationships in the United States are embedded in extended family relationships (Helms, 2013). 
Most American parents live in proximity and maintain weekly contact with adult children 
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(Swartz, 2009). Intergenerational relations may influence marital relations regardless of 
coresidence. Caregiving for coresident parents and support for noncoresident parents both affect 
adult children’s marital satisfaction in the United States (Bookwala, 2009; Polenick et al., 2017). 
Less is known on how intergenerational relationships affect marital power and the effect of 
education on power. 
In conclusion, the association between women’s education and their decision-making 
power at home varies by household structure in China. Women’s education increases their 
decision-making power in nuclear households, but not in multigenerational households where 
women live with their parents-in-law. China is aging rapidly resulting in an unprecedented 
burden of elderly care (F. Chen & Liu, 2009). Multigenerational coresidence as a form of 
intergenerational support remains prevalent in China (Zeng & Xie, 2014). Coresidence with 
husbands’ parents, however, may undermine the effect of women’s education on their decision-
making power in the household. 
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Table 1 Sample Percentages of the Outcome Variables by Wives’ Hukou 
Note: Numbers were weighted by the product of individual panel sampling weight and inverse probability 
of partner response to adjust for loss to follow-up, sampling design, and partner non-response. 
 
Table 2 Sample Percentages of the Predictor Variables by Wives’ Hukou 
Note: Numbers were weighted by the product of individual panel sampling weight and inverse probability 
of partner response to adjust for loss to follow-up, sampling design, and partner non-response. a. This 
category denotes middle school or higher for rural Hukou and middle school or less for urban Hukou. 
  
 Rural Hukou 
n = 2,885 
Urban Hukou 
n = 1,013 
Who has the final say on:  % % 
Allocation of household expenditure   
Wife 27.5 48.8 
Husband 61.9 43.8 
Other 10.6 7.4 
Savings, investment, and insurance   
Wife 25.0 47.1 
Husband 64.8 46.9 
Other 10.2 6.0 
Buying a house   
Wife 20.2 36.6 
Husband 69.1 56.1 
Other 10.7 7.3 
Educating and disciplining the children   
Wife 38.8 52.8 
Husband 50.6 40.5 
Other 10.6 6.7 
Buying expensive consumer goods, such as refrigerators,  
air-conditioners, and furniture sets 
  
Wife 29.8 45.5 
Husband 59.6 47.3 
Other 10.6 7.2 
 Rural Hukou n = 2,885 
Urban Hukou 
n = 1,013 
Predictor variables 
% % Living with 
husband’s parents 
% % Living with 
husband’s parents 
Wife’s education     
Less than elementary school 31.9 31.8   Elementary school 29.4 34.6 
Middle school a 38.7 36.9 54.0 32.1 
High school   29.1 21.9 College and above 16.9 29.0 
Wife lives with husband’s parents 34.6  28.6  
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Table 3 Summary Statistics for Statistically Significant Predictors of Wives’ Education and Living 
Arrangements by Wives’ Hukou 
Variables Rural n = 2,885 
Urban 
n = 1,013 
Statistically significant predictors of wife’s education   Mean/% Mean/% 
Wife’s age 41.2 44.3 
Wife is ethnic minority 11.1 4.5 
Wife’s region of birth   
North 19.9 16.2 
Northeast 9.0 26.4 
East 23.6 18.6 
South Central 22.7 27.1 
Southwest 20.3 7.0 
Northwest 4.5 4.7 
Highest education of wife’s parents   
Less than elementary school 49.8 29.2 
Elementary school 29.9 31.9 
Middle school 13.5 21.4 
High school and above 6.8 17.5 
Occupation of wife’s parents when she was 14   
Management/professional 10.1 25.7 
Administrative/service/business/other 4.7 16.9 
Agriculture/unemployed 76.9 35.3 
Manufacturing 8.3 22.1 
Wife’s number of siblings 3.3 2.9 
Wife has a brother 86.9 80.5 
Statistically significant predictors of wife’s living arrangements   
Husband’s Education   
Less than elementary school 15.7 13.6 Elementary school 28.2 
Middle school 41.9 35.2 
High school 14.3 28.5 College 22.7 
Husband’s income in 2010 (yuan)  14,102.4  21,642.1 
Highest education of husband’s parents   
Less than elementary school 49.0 33.6 
Elementary school 31.6 33.4 
Middle school 13.0 16.5 
High school and above 6.4 16.5 
Husband’s number of siblings 3.1 2.9 
Husband has a brother 78.1 69.7 
Husband is the first-born child 34.9 38.6 
Either wife or husband is an owner of the house  69.0 69.7 
Wife’s self-rated health (1-5, 1 = excellent, 5 = poor) 1.8 1.7 
Husband’s self-rated health (1-5, 1 = excellent, 5 = poor) 1.6 1.6 
Household engages in farm work 76.8 7.6 
Household income in 2010 (yuan)  30,607.5  49,405.3 
Number of wife’s parents-in-law alive in 2014   
Both father-in-law and mother-in-law alive 48.4 43.2 
Only father-in-law alive 13.5 16.6 
Only mother-in-law alive 38.1 40.3 
Husband’s attitude on “A man should live with his parents after marriage” 
(1-5, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
3.6 2.9 
Wife’s attitude on “Women should give birth to at least one boy to continue 
the family lineage.” (1-5, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
3.5 2.6 
Note: Descriptive statistics of all control variables are in Table A1 to Table A5 in Appendix A. Numbers 
were weighted to adjust for loss to sampling design, follow-up, and partner non-response.
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Table 4 Summary of Marginal Structural Models of Wives’ Education and Coresidence with Husbands’ 
Parents Predicting Wives Having the Final Say on Household Decisions by Wives’ Hukou  




















Panel A: Women with rural Hukou (n = 2,885) 
 Wife’s education a      
































 Wife’s education × wife lives with husband’s parents 
 Elementary school ×  











 Middle school and above × 





















Panel B: Women with urban Hukou (n = 1,013) 
 Wife’s education b      
































 Wife’s education × wife living with husband’s parents 
 High school × 











 College and above × 





















Note: a. Less than elementary school is the reference category. b. Less than high school is the reference 
category. †p < .1. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Standard errors were bootstrapped from 2,000 
iterations. Although the outcome is binary, a linear model yields more easily interpretable coefficients 




FIGURE 1. DIRECTED ACYCLIC GRAPH  
 
Note: E is wives’ education. C is coresidence with husbands’ parents. Y is wives having the final say on 
decisions. X are confounders of wives’ education. V are confounders of coresidence that are endogenous 
to wives’ education. U are unobserved confounders. Arrows represent putative causal associations. 
Assuming no unmeasured confounding means assuming the dotted arrows are not present. Weighting the 
data with inverse probability of treatment weights removes the dashed arrows, i.e., the associations 
between education, coresidence, and confounders. 
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